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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CONDITIONAL SALES-ANTECEDENT DEBT AS CONSIDERATIO.-S turned over
a used car to a certain "Auto Company" in part payment for a new car,
paying the balance in cash. The Auto Company fraudulently induced S to
sign a conditional sales contract for the new car, representing the paper to
be a Bill of Sale of the used car. S, relying on their statement, signed it
without reading it.

The conditional sales contract was turned over to the defendant as part
payment of an antecedent debt due him from the Auto Company and was
properly recorded by the defendant. S sold the new car to the plaintiff, who
paid cash therefor. At this time S obtained a Bill of Sale to the new car
from the Auto Company, which he turned over to the plaintiff.
The payments on the conditional sales contract not being made, defendant
seized the new car and plaintiff brings this action of replevin. HeId-(1)
While both parties are innocent of any wrongdoing, yet S (to whose rights
plaintiff succeeded) is less innocent of negligence than defendant, as he signed
the paper without reading it. Judgment should therefore be for the defendant
if he paid value for the conditional sales contract. (2) Payment of an antecedent debt is a sufficient parting with value to entitle defendant to the rights
of a bona fide purchaser for value. Long v. McAvoy, 33 Wash. Dec. 310, -°33
Pac. 930.
The basis of the decision is that one taking personal property in payment
of an antecedent debt cannot be placed in statu quo should the property be
taken from him. He is changed from one who has been paid to one who holds
a doubtful account. Between the time he received payment and the time he
would be made to return it, his position (and that of his debtor) may have
changed.
In this case relying on the payment defendant had waited until he was in
a position where it was impossible for him then to collect his debt.
J.W
INSURANcE-INvAriaiTY OF CONFISCATION IN5sLT'ANCE.-A novel question,
which caused the court to reverse itself, was presented to the Montana Supreme
Court in the case of Midland Motor Company v. Noriwich Union Fire Insurance Society, Limited, et al.,
234 Pac. 482.
The court first held that a contract of insurance which insured the vendor,
who retained title as security for the remainder of the purchase price of an
automobile which had been sold under a conditional contract of sale, against
loss or damage by reason of confiscation for any violation (otherwise than bv
the said vendor) of the laws of the United States relating to the transportation of articles subject to restricted sales, was void and unenforceable as
against public policy.
The first decision was based on §3450 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States and the decision of the Supreme Court in Goldmith v. Unitea
States, 254 U. S. 505, which held that the automobile itself became the offender
without regard to the criminal connection of the individual owning it. The
court said, "The fact, therefore, that the offense for which the car was forfeited in the instant case attaches primarily to the automobile, thereby making
it the offender, is of itself a reason for holding the contract illegal, and of

RECENT CASES
course, it is elementary that a contract of insurance indemnifying the assurea
against the consequences of is own illegal act is void."
On a rehearing of the case the court reversed itself and held that at the
time that this car was confiscated (January 4th, 1921) and m accordance with
the cases of United States v. One Haynes Automobile, 274 Fed. 926; Lewis v.
United States, 280 Fed. 5; United States v. One Packard Truck, 284 Fed. 391;
McDowell v. United States, 286 Fed. 521, and United States v. Yuginovch,
256 U. S. 450, insofar as it provided for the confiscation and forfeiture of an
automobile used in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors, the provisions of §3450 were repealed by the National Prohibition Act, therefore, that the confiscation of this car was under §26 of the National
Prohibition Act. This decision held, "It is not question in this case but thmt
it is competent and legal to insure the vendor of an automobile against confiscation thereof for a violation of the National Prohibition Act by a person
other than the vendor. Since this in effect is all that the policy and confiscation clause in question did, we must hold that the same are not void and unenforceable as against public policy."
Whether or not an innocent lien holder or the innocent vendor of a conditional sale should be allowed to intervene and assert his right and show
cause why a vehicle used for illegal transportation should not be forfeited
under §26 of the National Prohibition Act is a question which is in conflict.
As stated in McDowell v. United States, supra, it seems that the better rule
would be to allow the innocent party to assert his right. In the One Haynes
Automobile case the court said, "It was not to be assumed that Congress
intended to provide for the forfeiture of vehicles under §26 of the Volstead
Act, with its provision for preserving the rights of third persons and still leave
them subject to be forfeited under the more drastic provisions of Revised
Statute §34502' United States v. Sylvester 273 Fed. 256, also holds that the
interest of the innocent lien holder should be protected. This case was cited
with approval in the case of Jackson v. United States, 295 Fed. 620.
There is a long line of authority which holds that §3450 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States provides for a forfeiture only in those cases
where the vehicle is being used to transport articles with the intent to defraud
the United States of the tax payable on such articles, and that it can not be
applied to the mere transportation of illicit liquor in violation of the Prohibition Act. United States v. One Buick Automobile, 300 Fed. 584; United States
v. One Kissel Automobile, 298 Fed. 120; United States v. One Kissel Automobile, 296 Fed. 186; United States v. One Ford Automobile, 286 Fed. 204;
United States v. One Studebaker Automobile, 298 Fed. 191, United States v.
One Premier Automobile, 297 Fed. 1007, United States v. One Ford Automobile, 292 Fed. 207, and The Cherokee, 292 Fed. 212.
In view of this interpretation of §3450 of the Revised Statutes it is clear
that it does not apply to this case, but that §26 of the National Prohibition
Act applies. It follows that in the instant case, the innocent conditional vendor
has the right to intervene, in the case of a confiscation, to protect his lawful
interest, and that a contract of insurance, issued to protect such an interest,
would seem to be valid and enforceable because it is not against public policy.
R. A. (Mont.)
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case of State v. Arnold, 130 Wash. 370, 227 Pac. 505, was a trial for robbery.
The accused, a married man, takes the stand and is asked by the Prosecuting
Attorney- "Is it not true that you are living a portion of your time with a
certain woman in Seattle?" This was objected to, and on appeal the Supreme
Court said, "The testimony has shown that defendant was a married man and
we think the question was a proper one as affecting his credibility as a witness" (page 374 of opinion). Court cited Carr v. State, 81 Ark. 589, 99
S. W 831, in which case an appeal was made from decision of lower court in
not sustaining objection to question asked, "If accused had not been criminally intimate with a woman named." The court did not condemn this line
of cross-examination, but in both the Washington case (State v. Arnold)
and this Arkansas case (State v. Carr) the court stated that if this was error,
it was not prejudicial, the defendants in both cases having answered in the
negative.
Do these cases suggest that these courts will allow the State to show the
specific acts of immorality of male witness to affect his credibility as a witness?
As far as the writer has been able to ascertain, only one state, Missouri, is
willing to go that far. Specific acts of unchastity of male witnesses were
allowed to be shown to affect the credibility as a witness, in the cases of
State v. Rider, 95 Mo. 474, 8 S. W 723; State v. Shroyer 104 Mo. 441, 16 S. W
286; State v. Raven, 11o Mo. 4,19, 22 S. W 376. Missouri has always allowed
the specific acts of unchastity affecting the credibility of female witnesses.
See State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 133.
The opinion of our own court has been clearly stated as regards female
witnesses. The first case, State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 Pac. 28, held it was
an error for the court to sustain an objection to asking the witness if she
was a prostitute. This may be shown as affecting her credibility as a witness.
(The question of self-incrimination was not raised.) The case of State r.
Katon, 47 Wash. 1, 91 Pac. 250, states that a witness may be examined on
matters foreign to the issue when it reasonably tends to affect his or her
credibility. The dissenting opinion of Chadwick, J., in the case of State v.
Workman, 66 Wash. 292, 119 Pac. 251, to the effect that a female witness'
general reputation for unchastity should be allowed to affect credibility in
all cases, has been generally followed by the later cases. On page 428 of the
opinion in the case of State v. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 114 Pac. 711, the court
said, "It is a general rule that in prosecutions for rape specific acts of unchastity on the part of prosecutrix cannot be shown to offset her credibility
although her general reputation for chasitity may be shown for that purpose."
Other cases supporting the general rule that one may introduce evidence of
general reputation for chastity, affecting credibility of female witnesses are
State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 Pac. 470; Gardner v. Spelt, 86 Wash. 146,
149 Pac. 647, (it was here declared proper cross-examination to ask witness
in action for money paid if she had not been convicted of keeping a house
of prostitution-allowed to affect her credibility as a witness) State v. Terry,
99 Wash. 21, 168 Pac. 513 (follow the Coella case in re prostitution as affecting credibility). State v. Godwin, 131 Wash. 591, 230 Pac. 831.
While above cases allow general reputation for unchastity of female
witness to be shown, the writer has not been able to find a single case in
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this state whch allowed specific acts of unchastity as affecting credibility
unless it be a case of where the chastity of the witness is directly placed in
issue such as in the case of State v. Jones, 80 Wash. 588, 142 Pac. 35 (Seduction. Previous chaste character was an issue). Many cases state absolutely
that the specific acts of unchastity of female witness may not be shown to
affect her credibility as a witness. Unchastity must be proven by the general
reputation. See State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 653, 132 Pac. 416. See also
State v. Gay, supra, p. 428.
In discussing the status of the law in Washington on the question we
cannot disregard the case of State v. Pickel, 116 Wash. 600, 200 Pac. 184,
reversed on rehearing, 204 Pac. 184. The original case followed the general
Waslungton rule as established by State v. Coella, supra. But on the rehearing
the court said this rule should not be extended to other witnesses than the
accused. It is difficult to understand the reversal when the original question
arose us to an application of the rule to the defendant, Florence Pickel, being
charged as an accessory to the crime of rape.
So far our discussion has been limited largely to female witnesses and
the great significance of the case in point (State v. Arnold) is that it expresses
a tendency to apply the same rule to male witnesses. In the case of State v.
Schutte, a Connecticut case, 117 Atl. 508, the great weight of authority is
expressed contrary to Washington, Arkansas and Missouri. There they held,
"In a prosecution for first degree murder a witness for defendant cannot be
cross examined as to whether he had lived in adultery with a married woman,
solely to affect his credibility as a witness, since such testimony, the court said,
does not indicate lack of veracity on the part of the witness, but indicates
bad moral character"
In a discussion in the 53 Amer. State Reports 479,
the authorities for each state are cited. See also 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272.
The reason evidently belund the majority rule, is stated in the case of State v.
Larkin, 11 Nev. 330. "A witness may be chaste and yet untruthful."
The Supreme Courts of Washington and Arkansas have frequently cited
with approval Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 237 (2nd Ed.) wherein he says:
"In most cases evidence involving the whole moral character of the witness
will be received upon the reasonable theory that a man who is addicted to
vicious habits or who is prone to commit immoral acts, may be presumed to
have lost respect for truth and to be ready to perjure himself when it is in
his interest to do so."
Why should evidence of general reputation for unchastity be allowed to
affcct credibility of female witnesses and not as to male?
The Missouri courts early recognized that there should be no distinction.
Arkansas seems to have followed and now the Washington case discussed
cites with approval the Arkansas decision and says so in so many words that
such a line of cross-examination is proper. The age-old discussion of the
single standard is involved and though our Supreme Court is with the minority,
it is in keeping with the spirit of the social and economic changes of the times.
J. H.
Bnzs &.w
NOTES-PREENTMENT ron PAYzxE---TTLE To CHECx.-X sold
merchandise to Y, who gave lum his check on D bank in payment. X deposited
the check in A bank, in which he had an account, endorsed in blank and with
no special agreement A bank sent the check on to its correspondent bank B,

68
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which in turn sent it on to bank C, C sent the check to D bank for payment.
D marked the check paid and debited the account of Y, who had sufficient
funds on deposit. Instead of sending the cash back to C bank, D drew on
M bank in favor of C. C accepted this draft in payment and sent it on to
M bank to be honored. The draft was protested for non-payment, D having
failed the day before. The check was returned to X by the same channels,
and X now sues Y on the debt, Y setting up payment.
Held, that Y was not liable. The check was duly presented to the D
bank where he had sufficient funds to pay it; the check was cancelled, his
account debited, and what happened afterward could not prejudice his rights.
Jenson v. Meat Conpany, 230 Pac. 1081 (Mont.). If X's agent accepted a draft
rather than cash, it did so at its peril (citing Mollay v. Federal Reserve Bank,
281 Fed. 997). While this point is of interest to many, it is enough to say here
that the last legislature was dissatisfied with the rule and promptly passed
Senate Bill No. 57, Chapter 65, 1925 Session Laws. Now the rule in Montana
is that a collecting bank can safely take a draft or check of the bank on which
paper is drawn, and the drawer of the check is not released from liability
in case of the failure of such item to be paid.
But the most interesting part of the case has to do with points which
were incidental and perhaps decided only by dicta. In the first place the court
holds that a check indorsed in blank and deposited at a bank is presumed to
be deposited for collection in the absence of special agreement, and title is
retained in the depositor even though credited to him so that he can draw on
it provisionally. It is significant to note that the current authority is overwhelmingly against this view, and the presumption usually is that such an
indorsement passes title to the bank. Burton v. U S., 196 U. S. 283; Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Loyd, 90 N. Y. 530; Aeb v. Evansville Bank, 14 Wis.
74; 7 Corpus Juris 599 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694; 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552n;
47 A. S. R. 389; Scott's Cases on Trusts, page 67. This point would not have
been controlling here because on the theory of the court C bank was liable
to the depositor for having accepted a draft rather than cash; and also
because of R. C. M. 6109. But this dictum might become very vital in case
the initial bank becomes insolvent before final payment and the depositor
seeks a preferred claim against an agent bank which is solvent. See Scott's
Cases on Trusts, p. 77.
The court said that the relation which existed was one of agency. It
mentioned the rule of Mackersay v. Ramsays (9C1 & F 818), which was that
the initial bank for collection was an independent contractor and was liable
absolutely for the defaults of any sub-agent banks. 7 C. J. 606, citing many
cases. Montana followed this rule in Power v. First Nat. Bank, 6 Mont. 251,
12 Pac. 597, but the rule was changed by §6108 Revised Codes of Montana 1921, which made collecting banks agents of the depositor and not of the
initial bank. Logically the relation is not one of agency but of trusts. 18
Harvard Law Review 300, citing Com. Bk. v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50; 2Harvard Law Review 150; 08 Harvard Law Review 206. It follows then that
the trustee should not be liable for a diminution of the trust res. The doctrine
of Mackersay v. Raimsays above always was considered wrong on trust principles. The Montana law after R. C. M. (91) 6108 and 6109 is thus the better
rule according to trust theory although it expressly mentions an agency
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relation. Practically it is probably better than a strict trust rule because any
bank can be sued directly by the depositor.
It is submitted that Montana, especially since the amendment of R. C. M.
6108 as mentioned above, has a very liberal and reasonable law on this matter.
Commercial practice is given full legal effect, unhampered by antiquated
theories, and all those dealing in checks are bound by conditions they know
to exist.
R. D. N. (Mont).

NEomnaTuxa
OF MORTGAGE SECURED PROMMSSORY NoTEs.-Because of the
peculiar provisions of the Montana code, 9467 R. C. M. 1921, which allows
but one action, that of foreclosure, in case of a debt secured by a mortgage,
there has been considerable speculation in Montana as to the rights of an
innocent purchaser of a note secured by a mortgage when the note does not
recite on its face that it is secured by the mortgage. Interest in the proposition has been heightened by the fact that in two cases, Cornwh v. Wolverton,
3 Mont. 456, 81 Pac. 4; and Buhler v. Loftus, 53 Mont. 546, 165 Pac. 601,
the Supreme Court of Montana has mentioned the question but has each time
avoided a decision of the point.
The court has recently handed down a case, Wood v. Ferguson, 230 Pac.
592 (Mont.), which throws some light on the matter and is therefore interesting
from the viewpoint of bankers and security holders. In an action on a note
by a holder in due course against the makers and indorsers, the defense of
mortgage security was held not available to an indorser, the question of the
availability of the defense to the maker not being before the court.
In deciding this point the court makes reference to §847 and §847a
of the Montana code-sections in the body of Montana's negotiable instrument
law-which make a general indorser of negotiable paper a guarantor of payment. By this same negotiable instrument law, a holder in due course is
protected against all equitable defenses, 8464 R. C. M. 1921. Tis may well be
construed to mean that the court feels that the provision of the code above
cited does not apply to mortgage debts, at least where the mortgage is not
mentioned in the note. In discussing the case the court says "there does not
seem to be any question but that, as between the plaintiff and the makers and
indorsers of those notes, she was a holder in due course and as such, entitled
to maintain this action, and that the defense of the existence of the mortgage
security was not available to the defendant."
The language quoted indicates that the court would decide the question
in the same way in case the maker of the note were involved. A recent act
of the legislature has helped to remove the doubt, for it provides that "an
instrument otherwise negotiable m character is not affected by the fact that
it was at the time of the execution or subsequently secured by mortgage on
real or personal property. Laws 19L)3, ch. 143. This statute makes it unlikely
that the question will ever come before the court for final determination.
The Wood v. Ferguson case seems to be sound on principle, and to show
that in spite of the effect of the code section first referred to, Montana will
line up with those jurisdictions supporting the common law rule, best stated
in Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N. W 417, "The holder of the note
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may discard the mortgage entirely and sue and recover on his note." This
makes the statute mean that a holder in due course would cut off all equities,
but in order to get a deficiency judgment, foreclosure would be necessary.
A. S. (Mont).
INJURY TO WIFE AS

CAUSE

OF AcTiox FOR COu11iUNITY-RIGHT

OF WiF'J

SuE.-Plaintiff was struck and injured by defendant's automobile. Plaintiff's husband, without her knowledge or consent, accepted the sum of three
hundred dollars from defendant in full settlement of all damages resulting
to the community by reason of the injuries thus received. The husband at the
time of making the alleged settlement was not supporting plaintiff or her
children but had in fact deserted them. Held-that a complaint alleging these
facts stated a cause of action and hence the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer thereto. A husband who has deserted hs wife or children has
no right or authority to release her claim or dismiss her action for personal
injuries, since authority to control or manage community property ceased on
repudiating its duties. Wampler v. Beinert, 15 Wash. 494, -16 Pac. 855.
Under the code, R. C. S. §6892 the husband is made the manager of the
community and has disposition of community personalty. Therefore the husband is a necessary party to all actions arising because of personal injuries
to the wife, if the parties were living together as husband and wife at the
time injury was received. Haakins v. First Street Railway Co., 3 Wash. 592,
28 Pac. 1021, Schneider v. Biberger 76 Wash. 504, 136 Pac. 701. The reason
for this is that a cause of action arising out of an injury sustained by the
wife through the negligence of another is community property It follows
therefore that the refusal of a husband to join in an action instituted by the
wife to recover damages for personal injuries received by her would not give
the wife power to sue where they are living together. Haynes v. Colman Dock
Co., 108 Wash. 647, 185 Pac. 617. Section 181 R. C. S. states that the husband
be joined as a party with the wife except under certain conditions. One of
these conditions is that when she is living apart from her husband she may
sue or be sued alone.

TO

In the principal case the cause of action arising out of the injuries
received by her was community property and hence under the general rule
laid down in the cases cited, the action to recover the damages would have to
be brought in the name of the husband as party plaintiff. But the facts
alleged in the complaint if true, would seem to bring the case within the
statutory exception, namely, where the wife is living separate and apart from
her husband. It appeared from the allegations of the complaint that the
husband had made a settlement entirely out of proportion to the injury
received by plaintiff, and that the money received by him was used for the
purpose of instituting a divorce action against plaintiff. As stated by the
court, the husband had repudiated his duties toward the community and the
court, citing Dority v. Prity, 96 Texas 215, appears to lay down the rule that
where a husband repudiates his obligation or duties toward the community,
his authority to control or manage community property ceased.
The decision in the principal case can be sustained on the ground that the
complaint alleged facts that showed the plaintiff to be living separate and
apart from her husband and the further fact that the plaintiff's husband

RECENT CASES
attempted to assert the rights and powers of his position to accomplish his
own purposes. The right of the husband to manage and control community
property does not give him authority to beggar his family or to dispose of
some of the property for his own use. The injury to plaintiff being an injury
to her as well as to the community, the release given to defendant by plaintiff's husband did not preclude her right of action because the husband had
no authority to give the release as the plaintiff was living separate and apart
from him.
A.R.
STAT= OF Fnituns-PAnT PEnroxa .NcE--CowsTaucrivw FaAur.-This is an
action at law for deceit in which the plaintiff relies for Is cause of action
on an oral contract between imself and the defendant, whereby the defendant promised to lease certain premises to the plaintiff for three years if the
plaintiff would give up his option on certain other premises. The plaintiff
gave up his option and the defendant refused to lease, the plaintiff being
put to great expense in securing other premises. Held: Complaint stating
these facts and that the defendant did not intend to perform at the time of
his pronmse, stated a cause of action at law even though the plaintiff was
forced to prove a contract unenforceable by reason of the Statute of Frauds
(Rev. Codes Mont, 19,1, §7519), the court saying that part performance will
take the case out of the Statute of Frauds when it works a fraud on the
party so performing. Mxclntyre v. Dawes, 29 Pac. 846.
That a promise made to do an act in the future without intent to perform
will ground an action of deceit is sustained both by the Statute (§7575) and the
decisions. (Edgtngton v. Fitzmaurzee, 29 Chan. Div. 459; Swift '0. Rounds, 19
R. I. 527.) The court feels that as a general rule under §7519 and §10613,
Rev. Codes Mont., 1921, a plaintiff cannot prevail even in an action of deceit
when he is driven to rely on a contract within the provisions of the Statute.
But the court here takes the case out of the Statute on the grounds of part
performance. Two objections may be raised to the grounds on which the
court got around the Statute.
First. There does not seem to be any authority either in Montana or
elsewhere for avoiding the Statute of Frauds in an action at law because of
part performance. Pomeroy says (Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., §2240)"The doctrine of part performance is purely a creation of equity and is not
recognized at law. No distinctly legal action can be maintained on an oral
contract within the Statute of Frauds." This contract is so barred, being an
oral contract to lease for three years. (Rev. Codes Mont., 1921, §7519 and
§10613, [5].) All of the cases cited by the opinion are actions in equity and,
in fact, the case cited at length, Wood v. Babe, 96 N. Y. 414, says in another
place that the doctrine of part performance is one "peculiar to equity." It is
true this is not an action on the contract, but the opimon itself states the
general rule concering actions where the plaintiff is driven to rely on a
contract within the Statute, and it is elsewhere clearly recognized. (Dreidle
v. Manger, 220 Pac. 1107.) It would seem, then, that tis case goes a long
way in a new direction and that Montana law is again borrowing from equity.
Nor do the Montana statutes give any authority for this. Section 7519
expressly declares an oral lease for more than a year invalid and no exception
of any kind is made. Section 7593 says agreements for the sale of real
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property or estates therein must be in writing, but specifically excepts the
equitable jurisdiction of courts to specifically enforce contracts partly performed. Thus it is obvious the Code contemplated no such jurisdiction at law.
Second. But even in equity, is a case of this kind sound in principle and
supported by the decisions? Certainly if it is so, it is another extension of an
already overly extended doctrine. Not any and every part performance will
take a case out of the Statute of Frauds in equity. The Montana cases have
in the main been cases of possession of land plus improvements. (Stevens v.
Trafton, 36 Mont. 520, 93 Pac. 810; Wright v. Brooks, 47 Mont. 99, 130 Pac.
968.) The reason commonly given for taking the case out of the Statute in
such cases being, as stated in Ducie v. Ford, 8 Mont. 233, 19 Pac. 414, that the
possession and improvement point unequivocally to a contract between the
parties. But surely the giving up of an option on other premises would not
point unequivocally to a contract to lease the premises in question. Subsequent to Ducie v. Ford, Montana courts, together with a majority of American
jurisdictions, have further extended the doctrine to include cases where the
plaintiff has given services in reliance on defendant's oral promise. (Burns v.
Smith, 21 Mont. -51, 53 Pac. 742; Wilburn v. Wagner 59 Mont. 386, 196 Pac.
978.) In so extending the doctrine they have followed the early New York
case of Rhodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sandf. Chan. 979, which has not been followed in
New York (Mahaney v. Carr 67 N. E. 903.) In this connection it is interesting to note the statement of Lord Blackburn in Maddison v. Alderson, Law
Reports, 8 Appeal Cases 467, made in 1883, that the doctrine of allowing possession to take a case out of the Statute was an anomaly and "ought not to be
extended."
The opinion implies that fraud alone will not take the case out of the
Statute. It is rather remarkable, then, that the court should go ahead and
take the case out on the ground that the defendant's failure to perform his
promise after the plaintiff's part performance would work on the plaintiff
what the court calls a "fraud." If actual fraud will not take a case out of
the Statute, should constructive fraud do so? It should also be borne in mind
that the doctrine laid down in Mullet v. Halfpenny, in 1699 (Precedents in
Chancery, 404, and cited in 2 Vernon 373), that actual fraud will take a case
out of the Statute in a court of equity, is still generally, if not universally,
followed in this country
(Halligan v. Prey, 141 N. W 944; Ryan v. Dox,
34 N. Y. 307 Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 639.)
G. B. (Mont.).

LEGAL ETHics--DIvORcE Acioi.-A Mrs. Sisson, desiring to obtain a
divorce, employed Coleman, an attorney, orally agreeing to pay him whatever
fee he saw fit to charge. Coleman accepted the employment. After two
preliminary hearings were had, but before the main trial, Coleman and Mrs.
Sisson signed an agreement whereby Mrs. Sisson agreed to pay Coleman the
sum of $1,000 if successful in obtaimng a judgment for divorce and alimony
of $5,000 or over. Coleman obtained a judgment for $5,000 and his wife,
as assignee, is now suing on this written contract.
Held--Coleman's assignee, failing to allege or prove circumstances which
led up to the execution of the written contract and circumstances surrounaing
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its making, failed to allege or prove facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The court said, "The law permits an attorney and client, before the
fiduciary relation begins, to enter into any contract respecting the attorney's
compensation so long as it is not prohibited by law or does not contemplate
an illegal act." Coleman v. Sisson, 230 Pac. 582 (Mont.), R. C. M. 19-1 §8993,
and Haley v. Hollenback, 53 Mont. 491, 165 Pac. 459. If any contract is
entered into after fiduciary relation exists, the burden is upon the attorney
to show that undue influence was not used, advantage was not taken, and that
the client knew and understood its provisions.
The court further justifies tlus decision on the grounds of public policy.
Montana decisions are in accord with the weight of authority, to the effect
that contracts generally between attorney and client, contingent on the outcome
of litigation do not contravene public policy. Haley v. Hollenback, supra.
But in Coleman v. Sisson the court says, "This contract, entered into while a
divorce action was pending, providing for an attorney's fee contingent upon
the amount of alimony awarded the wife in that action, is void as against
public policy."
This case is in harmony with the weight of authority and is eminently
sound.
H. 0. (Mont.).

CHARITIES--VALmIDrY-PUrPOSES--PUBLIc Poicy.-The testator made a residuary devise providing for the teaching of homeopathuc treatment confined
to the doctrine of certain named text-books. Testimony of physicians of
modern schools was to the effect that the proposed system would be ineffective
and that bad results would follow in their opimon from a lack of some treatment approved by them. Held-Devise void as detrimental to public health
and against public policy.-In re Hill's Estate, 119 Wash. 62, 204 Pac. 1055, 207
Pac. 689.

One may will his property for any purpose that is not illegal, immoral,
or against the public policy of the state.-Thomas v. Natl. Christian Assoca,
tion, 88 N. %V 683 (Nebr.). A bequest in trust for the purpose of giving
premiums for treatises on subjects conducive to the advancement of medical
science and for printing and distributing the treatises to which premiums
shall have been awarded, is a valid charitable bequest.-Chapman v. Newell,
146 Iowa 415, 125 N. W 324.
The holding of the principal case is based on the fact that the teachings
reqmred by the bequest are not supported by any modern school of medicine,
hence detrimental to the public health and therefore making the bequest void
as against public policy. No authorities were cited except some dicta from a
New York case to the effect that legacies tending to endanger the public
health are void. The dissenting opinion by Hovey, J., pointed out the right
of a testator to make any disposal of property that was not illegal, the fact
that the evidence to the dangerous effects of such teachings was the testimony
of physicians of modern schools and concluded, that there was evidence "that
the proposed system would be ineffective but there was notlng to show that it
would be injurious. For the courts to say what is or is not the proper method
of treating the sick or afflicted is entirely beyond their province2' The testimony of aleopathic physicians here would seem to be analogous to the deterim-
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nation of the validity of a bequest to a Catholic institution by Protestant
witnesses or vice versa.
L. S.
CoxTanxuio -- AsAc-mezN.-T-rQuAsi-CowunAcT.-The plaintiff and defendant in this action and another become sureties on the bond of one Robinson
to the Montana Oil Company. Robinson defaulted and the company sued the
parties to the bond. This litigation resulted in a judgment against the plaintiff in the present case. The plaintiff here paid the judgment and had been
unable to reimburse lumself. Later he discovered that the defendant owned
certain real estate within the state and brought suit for contribution for the
defendant's one-third share of the judgment, suing out a writ of attachment
in aid of the action. Service of summons was made by publication, as the
defendant was in California. The defendant appeared specially, moving to
discharge the attachment upon the contention that the action was not one of
those for which attachment was allowed.
Section 9256 of the Montana Revised Codes permits attachment "in an
action on a contract, express or implied, for the direct payment of money."
The court points out that this is not an action on the original contract, but
upon an implied assumpsit for money paid for the use of the defendant.
It then concludes that nevertheless it is an action on an implied contract within
the meaning of the above statute. Wall v. Brockman, 232 Pac. 779, (Mont.).
The result of this case seems to be that the term "implied contract" as
used in §9256 is to be interpreted so as to include quasi contracts, as in the
case of conversion where the plaintiff elects to waive the tort and trust to his
remedy in assumpsit, 14 Mont. 508, 137 Pac. 326. The court cites with approval
the case of Nevada Co. v. Farnsworth, 89 Fed. 164, deciding, under an attachment statute similar to that of Montana, that an attachment was properly
issued in case of conversion where the tort is waived. This view of the import
of the case is further strengthened by the fact that the Montana court has
not fallen into the common error of confusing quasi contract and actions in
true contract. SchaeFfer v. Miller 41 Mont. 417, 100 Pac. 970.
At first blush the case under consideration seems inconsistent with the
case of Schaefer v. Mdler supra, where it was decided that a suit in quasi
contract was an action on an "obligation not founded upon an instrument in
writing other than a contract" and not on "contract." However, in the latter
case the court was confronted with the application of one of two limitation
statutes and applied the one which more nearly conformed with the legislative classification of actions for the purpose of limitation. In the present case
the court does not disregard the distinction between contracts implied in fact
and those implied in law, but rather considers them merged in the term
"implied contract" as used in §9256.
It seems that the court overlooked one basis upon which it might have
rested its decision. That is the rule that a statute borrowed from another
jurisdiction brings with it all prior judicial construction. Miller v. Miller
131 Pac. 22. Section 9256, enacted in 1895, was taken from the California
Code of Civil Procedure. As early as 1879 the California court had laid down
the proposition that attachment was authorized in actions in quasi contract
under this statute. Peat Fuel Co. v. Tuck, 53 Calif. 304.
This case is very important from a practical point of view, especially in
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actions against defendants who are out of the jurisdiction but who have
property within the state. If the opposite result had been reached, no redress
would be available in the Montana courts against one guilty of conversion
unless he remained within the state, for under the doctrine of Pennoyer v.
Neff 95 U. S. 714, the court must get the property before it prior to granting
a judgment in an action quasi in rem.
T. J. AND A. B. (Mont.).
PLEADN--FiiNG

SumpLEMENTAiY

Axswa.--Plaintiff sued defendant on

an open account and defendant filed general denial in February, 1922. In
April, 1922, defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt and on July 18, 19,3, he
was duly discharged from all debts, including the one sued on in this action.
The case was set for trial in December, 1923, and a few days thereafter defendant fied and served notice of motion and motion for leave to file supplemental answer, setting forth Is adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court in denying defendant's motion.
Held, that the court did not abuse its discretion. Pile v. Bushnell, 233 Pac.
124 (Mont.).
This is a case of first impression in this state on this question. In the
case of Henderson v. Daniels, 62 Mont. 373, 205 Pac. 964, this court defined
"reasonable time" to be "so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances,
to do convementiy what the contract or duty reqires should be done in a
particular case." This definition was given in connection with a motion for
leave to amend and the court here applies the same definition on the motion
to file a supplemental answer. It may be said, then, construing §9181,
Rev. Codes 1921, that a party cannot file a supplemental answer as a matter
of right but it rests within the discretion of the court whether the application
has been made "within a reasonable time after the facts material to the cause
come to the knowledge of the moving party."
However, in the case of Drought v. Curtiss, 8 How. Pract. (N. Y.) 56,
the court said, "Where the facts to be incorporated and pleaded in the supplemental answer, go to divest the plaintiff of the right to maintain the action,
*
*
it is the duty of the court to grant the motion. The word 'may'
(in the statute) in such case means 'must', and it would make no difference
whether the motion be made at the earliest day or not." Probably the fact
that the discharge in bankruptcy does not extingush the plaintiff's right to
prosecute the action if he does not plead it, distinguishes the instant case
from the N. Y. case. See 7 C. J. 414 et seq. It may be remarked that the
supplemental action under the code is a substitute for the old plea of prus
darrien continuence, except that the code provision is less restrictive in its
reqmrements.
Axo- (Mont.).
CUATrEL MoRTGAGEs-PoPERTY SUi.TEc---GaowiXG

Caop-STATUTES-COl-

STaucioN.A executes a chattel mortgage to B, March 11, 1922, on all of his
"crop of apples now growing or to be grown during the crop season of the
years 1922 and 1923." April, 1923, A executes to C a chattel mortgage covering the 1923 crop of apples on the same premises. Held-C's mortgage prevails over B's. Kennewwtk Supply LkStorage Co. v. Fry, et aL., 33 Wash. Dec.
209, 233 Pac. 658. Rem. Com. Stat. § 3779 provides that "chattel mortgages
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may be made upon all kinds of personal property * * * and upon growing
crops and upon crops before the seed thereof shall be sown or planted. Provided, that the mortgages of crops before the seed shall have been sown or
planted, for more than one year in advance, is hereby forbidden, and all
securities or mortgages hereafter executed on such unsown or unplanted crops
are declared void and of no effect, unless such crops are to be sown or planted
within one year from the time of the execution of the mortgage." Thus no
authority is given for chattel mortgages upon crops yet to be grown which
are not crops for which seed is planted or sown (such as grains). And as
applied to such a crop as is under consideration, "growing crops" must be held
to relate only to crops grown and harvested the year the chattel mortgage is
given. The fact that at the time B's mortgage was executed, "fruit spurs"
had already formed, from which in the following year the blossoms and fruit
would develop, does not aid the situation. It could equally well be said that
when the tree was yet nursery stock it contained the rudiments of the crop
of 19293.
H. S.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE FEDERAL TRADE Co3inssio-,-.

By Gerard C. Henderson.
University Press, 1924, pp. xiii, 382.

New Haven: Yale

This is the first of a series of intensive studies carried on under the supervision of the Committee on Administrative Law and Practice appointed by the
Legal Research Committee under the Commonwealth Fund. It is intended
as a part of the program "which should reveal the workings of carefully
selected administrative organs, in so far as their activities mean law and not
mere internal administration." The author very carefully limits himself to
"a study in administrative law and procedure" and does not attempt a consideration of such parts of the work of the Federal Trade Commission as
have to do with special investigations and reports, the issuing of licenses or
the administering of the Webb-Pomerene Act.
The discussion is divided into a relation of the history of the political
and legislative factors leading up to the passage of the Act, an elucidation of
procedure, discussion of findings, an enumeration of practices which have
come before the Commission for action, and finally a very valuable chapter in
which are made conclusions and suggestions which point the way to a possibility of even more valuable service in the future than has been rendered in
the past.
Throughout the book a thoroughness of investigation, a keenness of
analysis, and a maturity and balance of judgment are displayed which one
might wish could be more often found in studies of our agencies of government.
The Federal Trade Commission is at present in a position to understand
and sympathize with the tribulations of the Supreme Court in those days
prior to the appointment of John Marshall. It is a cause for sober reflection
and some sadness to the lawyer, the student of government or the student of
business that an agency so fraught with potentialities for good or evil as the
Federal Trade Commission should find its position so uncertain, its proceduro
so unorthodox, its power so ill-defined and its whole status so affected by
political changes or vicissitudes as its history up to the present time would
indicate.
There is need for a clearing of the atmosphere in regard to the attitude
of government toward monopoly and restraint of trade. Perhaps in view of
our existing legislation it would be more accurate to say that there is need
for a clearer understanding of Just what is monopoly or restraint of trade.
The underlying economic tendencies and the effect of modern business methods

